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Abstract This paper presents an application of PVS to the verication
of security protocols The objective is to provide mechanical support for
a verication method described in  The PVS formalization consists
of a semantic embedding of CSP and of a collection of theorems and
proof rules for reasoning about authentication properties We present an
application to the NeedhamSchroeder public key protocol
  Introduction
Authentication protocols are used in insecure networks by principals who want
to get assurance about their correspondents identity Designing such protocols
is notoriously errorprone and attacks can often exploit weaknesses or subtle
aws Validating authentication protocols requires a rigorous analysis and several
formal approaches have been advocated for this purpose  	
 	 
In 	 Schneider presents such a method based on CSP  The approach
relies on a general network model which includes legitimate protocol participants
the users and an intruder the enemy Both the users and the enemy are specied
as CSP processes and authentication properties are expressed as constraints on
the sequences of messages the whole network can produce
The verication strategy uses rank functions that is functions which assign
an integer value to messages A key theorem shows that authentication properties
can be veried by nding a rank function which satises appropriate conditions
These depend on the nature of the encryption mechanism used on the denition
of the users and on the property to be veried An important benet of the
technique is to decompose an authentication property  a global property of a
network  into local properties of the protocol participants
This paper shows how the PVS theorem prover  can provide eective me
chanical support to the above method Using a semantics embedding of CSP we
specify the general network model in PVS and derive the important theorems
about authentication and rank functions We then dene specialised PVS rewrite
rules and proof commands to facilitate the verications With these rules and
	
commands the proofs of authentication are very systematic and require only lit
tle manual guidance This allows the user to concentrate on the most important
aspects of the analysis nding rank functions
In the remainder of this paper we give a brief introduction to CSP and an
overview of the modelling and analysis approach We then describe the formal
ization of the network model and of the verication method in PVS We give a
simple example of application to the Needham Schroeder public key protocol	
Finally we discuss and compare our developments with other mechanisations of
CSP and with other verication methods for security protocols
 Authentication Protocols in CSP
  CSP Notation
CSP is an abstract language for describing concurrent systems which interact
through message passing  Systems are modelled in terms of the events they
can perform each event corresponding to a potential communication between a
system and its environment CSP is a process algebra systems are constructed
from a set of elementary processes which can be combined using operators such as
prexing choice or parallel compositionDierent semantic models are available
in this paper only the simplest  the socalled trace semantics  is considered
We assume that a xed set   of all possible events is given A process is
characterised by a set of traces that is nite sequences of elements of   Each
trace represents a possible sequence of communications one can observe on the
process interface The set of traces of a process P is prexclosed if one observes
a trace tr then all the prexes of tr have been seen before
The particular dialect we use includes four primitive notions The syntax of
process expressions is as follows
P  Stop j a P j  
i I
P
i
j P
 
 P

j P
 
jAjP

j P
 
jjjP


where a is an element of   I a nonempty set and A a subset of   These
expressions have the following informal interpretation
 Stop is the process which cannot engage in any event deadlock
 a P is able initially to perform only the event a after which it behaves as
P 
  
i I
P
i
is the choice among an indexed family of processes P
i
 The result
ing process can behave as any one of the P
i
 When only two processes are
involved choice is denoted by P
 
 P


 P
 
jAjP

is the parallel composition of P
 
and P

with synchronization on
events in A If one of the processes is willing to engage in an event of A then
it has to wait until the other is ready to perform the same event On events
which do not belong to A P
 
and P

do not synchronise they can perform
any such event independently of each other P
 
jjjP

is an abbreviation for
P
 
jjP



   A Model for Authentication Protocols
In the analysis of authentication protocols we consider the general network
architecture shown in Fig 	 The network consists of a set of user processes and
of an enemy which has full control over the communication medium The enemy
can block readdress duplicate corrupt or fake messages but we assume that
it cannot decrypt or encrypt messages without the appropriate keys
ENEMY
trans.n rec.n. . .rec.2trans.2trans.1 rec.1
USER 1 USER USER2 n. . .
Fig  The network
Each user has a unique identity Its interface with the medium consists of two
channels one for transmission and one for reception Accordingly communica
tions are modelled by two types of events A transmission event is of the form
transijm and is interpreted as user i sends a message m destined for user j
A reception event is of the form recijm and means i receives a message m
apparently from user j The communication channels are private no user other
than i can produce events of the form transijm or recijm
In order to model the capabilities of the enemy we use a relation  which
species when new messages may be generated from existing ones S  m means
that knowledge of all the messages of the set S is enough to produce the message
m The relation depends on the particular encryption mechanism used but we
can assume that certain natural conditions are satised such as
Sm m  S  S  m
S S

m S  S

	 S  m S

 m
With the preceding notations the enemy is specied as follows
ENEMYS   
ijm
transijm ENEMYS 
 fmg
   
ijmjSm
recijm ENEMYS
This describes the behaviour of an enemy which has knowledge of a set of mes
sages S Such a process can either allow a user to transmit a message m after
which it behaves as ENEMYS 
 fmg or generate a new message from the set

S and send it to an arbitrary destinator The enemys behaviour at the start of
a protocol is modelled by the process ENEMYINIT where INIT represents the
information initially available to the enemy
The user description depends entirely on the protocol being modelled and
consists of a family of processes USERi The whole network is the following
composition of users and enemy
NET   jjj
i
USERi  jtrans recjENEMYINIT
The users do not communicate directly with each other but the enemy and the
composition of users synchronize on all transmission and reception events
  Checking Authentication Properties
The specication of various security properties is discussed in 	 Authenti
cation involves two disjoint sets of events T and R a process P satises the
property T authenticates R if occurrence of any event of T in a trace of P is
preceded by occurrence of some element of R This is denoted by
P sat T authenticates R 	
Examples in 	 illustrate how this relates concretely to authentication For
mally T authenticates R is an abbreviation for the trace predicate
trR  hi  trT  hi 
where  denotes projection

and hi is the empty trace The statement 	 is
interpreted as all the traces tr of P satisfy predicate  that is any trace of
P which does not contain events of R does not contain events of T either
In order to verify authentication properties of a protocol we have to prove
statements of the form NET sat T authenticates R It can be seen that this
condition is equivalent to
NET jRjStop sat trT  hi 
This equivalence is the basis of the proof strategy described in 	 The idea
is to assign to every message m an integer value m called its rank in such a
way that messages occurring in events of T have nonpositive rank while only
messages of positive rank can be produced by NET jRj Stop
LetM be the message space for a given protocol A rank function is a function
 from M to the integers Given such a function we denote by 

the set of
messages of positive rank and by M tr the set of messages which occur in a
trace tr From the denition of NET and ENEMY one can derive the following
key theorem 	

tr R is the maximal subsequence of tr all of whose elements belong to R

Theorem If the four conditions below are satised
INIT  


Sm S  

	 S  m m  
T  

 
i USERi jRjStop sat M trrec  

M trtrans  


then
NET sat T authenticates R
With this result one can verify authentication properties by nding an appro
priate rank function Showing that the four conditions are satised is simpler
than a direct approach because user processes can be considered individually
 Embedding CSP in PVS
Our mechanization is based on a semantic embedding of CSP Traces are repre
sented by lists of events processes are prexclosed sets of traces and the CSP
operators are functions on processes which preserve the closure condition Such
a formalization is classic and similar to Camilleris HOL embedding of CSP 
The main dierences are the representation of events and processes and the vari
ant of CSP considered In  events are considered as atomic symbols and are
represented by strings Our formalisation is more general and uses parametric
types Given any type T traceT and processT represent traces and pro
cesses with events of type T The CSP dialect considered by Camilleri is Hoares
original denition of deterministic processes  In this model a process has two
components a set of traces and an alphabet of events representing the interface
Due to this interface there are restrictions on certain CSP operators For our
purpose it is better to follow 	 and use the CSP variant presented previously
Our denition of processes relies on PVS subtyping processT is a subtype
of settraceT dened as follows
S VAR settraceT
process TYPE  f S  Snull AND prefix closedS g	
A process is any set of traces which contains the empty trace null and which is
prexclosed All general results about sets or sets of traces apply then immedi
ately to processes
The CSP primitives are easily dened
 It is also convenient to generalise
the two parallel composition operators to arbitrary nonempty families of pro
cesses This nonstandard extension of CSP does not pose any theoretical prob
lem in the trace model and generalises the results presented in Sec  We can
consider networks with innitely many users and all the theorems still hold
Moreover the PVS statement and proof of these theorems are much simpler if
innite parallel composition is allowed

Since PVS has a xed syntax we cannot use the standard CSP notations In
stead we use existing PVS symbols as indicated in Tab 	 The operators Choice
and Interleave are polymorphic functions which apply to indexed families of
processes For example Choice is of parametric type U  processT 
processT PVS has a special syntax for denoting the applications of such
functions to lambda terms Choicelambda i Pi can be written Choice	
i Pi More complex expressions are also valid
Choice
 i j Qi  Pi j
Choice
 i j  i  j i  j  Stopnat	
In the two expressions above PVS infers the correct parameter instantiation
from the types of the variables and processes In the rst case U is instantiated
with a tuple type and in the second case U is instantiated with the dependent
type inat
 fjnat i  jg
Table  Syntax of process expressions
Operation CSP PVS
Stop Stop Stop
Prex a P a  P
Choice P
 
P

P  P

i I
P
i
Choice
 i  Pi
Parallel Composition P
 
jAjP

ParAP P
P
 
jjj P

P  P
jjj
i I
P
i
Interleave
 i  Pi
Recursive processes are dened as least xed points of monotonic functions
Given such a function F of type U  processT  U processT
muF denotes the least xed point of F This form of the mu operator is necessary
for dening recursive processes with parameters A simpler form is available for
the nonparametric case
The preceding elements allow us to dene CSP processes in PVS In order to
reason about such processes we provide various lemmas such as the associativity
of choice and parallel composition 
 For specifying properties of processes we
imitiate the sat operator Properties are predicates on traces that is sets of
traces and the satisfaction relation is
P E bool  subsetP E	
For example we can translate the statement P sat trD  hi to
P  f tr  projtr D  null g	
Various rules about satisfaction and induction theorems for reasoning about
xed points are provided 



 The Authentication Model in PVS
 Network
It is routine to specify the network Events are represented by an abstract data
type parameterized by the types of user identities and messages
eventI M TYPE DATATYPE
BEGIN
transt snd t rcv I t msg M trans
recr rcv r snd I r msg M rec
END event
From this specication PVS generates an axiomatic denition of the data type
The functions trans and rec are constructors events are either of the form
transi
 j
 m or reci
 j
 m Functions such as t snd give access to the
components of events The two functions trans and rec are recognisers of
type event  bool and characterize transmission and reception events re
spectively
The enemy is dened using the least xed point operator The process de
pends on two type parameters as above and on a message generation relation
enemyIdentity Message TYPE
  setMessage Message  bool THEORY
BEGIN
			
FXS processevent 
Choice
 i j m transi j m  Xaddm S
 Choice
 i j m  S  m reci j m  XS
enemy setMessage  processevent  muF
END enemy	
For such a denition to be sound PVS requires us to show that F is monotonic
by generating a proof obligation TCC 		
Users can be arbitrary processes provided they satisfy the interface con
straints The type user process below captures this restriction
LocalEventsi setevent 
fe  EXISTS m j e  transijm OR e  recijmg
user process TYPE 
i Identity  fP  subsetsigmaP LocalEventsig	
The function sigma gives the set of events P can generate Any user of the above
type is a function of domain Identity and range processT such that the set
of events generated by useri is included in LocalEventsi For dening
networks we use the function
networkbaddy P processT  Parfullsetbaddy InterleaveP
where baddy is any process and P is of type Identity  processT The
constant fullset is the set of all transmission and reception events

  Key Theorems
The main results of Sec  are proved in a theory network which has the same
parameters as enemy and makes the following assumption
montonic gen ASSUMPTION
FORALL A B m subsetA B AND A  m IMPLIES B  m	
Within the theory monotonic gen can be used like an axiom but PVS gener
ates a TCC to check that the assumption holds when one imports a particular
instance of network
A rst lemma follows from the previous assumption and is proved using the
induction rule for least xed points
GenS setMessage  f m  S  m g
PropS settraceevent 
f tr  subsetrec msgtr GenunionS trans msgtr g
enemy prop THEOREM enemyS  PropS	
Informally this means that any message enemyS can produce is generated
from the set S and the messages the enemy has intercepted from users
Now given a function rho of type Messageint we dene two trace
predicates
RankUserrho settraceevent 
ftr  pos transrho tr IMPLIES pos recrho tr g
RankEnemyrho settraceevent 
ftr  pos recrho tr IMPLIES pos transrho tr g
where pos recrho
 tr and pos transrho
 tr are true if all the reception
or transmission events of tr respectively have positive rank by rho The rst
half of the main theorem is a corollary of enemy prop
rank property COROLLARY positiverho INIT
AND FORALL S positiverho S implies positiverho GenS
IMPLIES enemyINIT  RankEnemyrho	
If the two premisses are satised then the enemy cannot generate messages of
nonpositive ranks unless it receives such messages from the users
For convenience we use a specic restriction operator the process P jRjStop
is written P  R in PVS We then get the following essential property
main result LEMMA baddy  RankEnemyrho
AND FORALL i useri  R  RankUserrho
IMPLIES networkbaddy user  R  ftr  positiverho trg	
In this lemma the two premisses are symmetric baddy does not generate mes
sages of negative rank if the users send messages of positive ranks and useri
 R does not send messages of negative ranks if it only receives messages of pos
itive ranks By induction the two conditions imply that no message of positive
rank can ever appear in a trace of networkbaddy
user  R From this and
lemma rank property we obtain the main theorem

authentication by rank THEOREM
positiverho INIT
AND FORALL S m
positiverho S AND S  m IMPLIES rhom  
AND FORALL i useri  R  RankUserrho
AND non positiverho T
IMPLIES networkenemyINIT user  authT R	
 Automating the Verications
The previous theorem is the main tool for verifying authentication properties
When using it most of the eort concentrates on properties of the form useri
 R  RankUserrho There are also hidden conditions which arise from the
type of user we have to prove that useri can only generate events which
belong to LocalEventsi All these proofs can be partially automated by using
the PVS rewriting facilities and by dening specic proof strategies
The interface constraints are of the form subsetsigmaP
 E where P is
a CSP expression and E is a set of events We can systematically develop rules
which rewrite the above inclusion in a simpler form according to the toplevel
operator of P There is such a rule for every CSP primitive a few examples are
given below
interface pref LEMMA subsetsigmaa  P E IFF
Ea AND subsetsigmaP E
interface choice LEMMA subsetsigmaChoiceP E IFF
FORALL i subsetsigmaPi E
interface stop LEMMA subsetsigmaStop E
interface par LEMMA subsetsigmaP E AND subsetsigmaP E
IMPLIES subsetsigmaParAP P E	
All such lemmas can be installed as automatic rewrite rules which PVS applies
in conjunction with builtin simplication and decision procedures The rst
two rules are inconditional rewritings which applies in the left to right direction
interface stop is also inconditional but matching terms are rewritten to true
The last rule is conditional terms matching the right hand side of the implication
reduce to true provided the premisses are also reduced to true by the decision
procedures or by further rewriting
Lemma interface pref introduces expressions of the form Ea For user
processes E is LocalEventsi for some xed i and two more rewrite rules are
necessary
local transmission LEMMA LocalEventsitransi j m
local reception LEMMA LocalEventsireci j m	
In practice automatic rewriting with these two rules and the preceding lemmas
prove almost all interface constraints The few exceptions are usually due to
xed points The presence of quantiers in the rules for xed points interrupts

the chain of rewrites and little manual intervention is required before rewriting
can proceed
For properties of the form P  R  RankUserrho rewrite rules can also
largely reduce the proof eort However rewriting is not sucient and the rules
must be supplemented with specic proof strategies
In a similar way as above two sets of rewrite rules are constructed which
apply to expressions of the form P  R or P  RankUserrho For example
the rules for prex and Stop are
restriction pref LEMMA
a  P  B  IF Ba THEN Stop ELSE a  P  B ENDIF
rank user output LEMMA transijm  P  RankUserrho
IFF rhom AND P  RankUserrho
rank user input LEMMA recijm  P  RankUserrho
IFF rhom IMPLIES P  RankUserrho
restriction stop LEMMA Stop  B  Stop
rank user stop LEMMA Stop  RankUserrho	
Such lemmas are more complex than the interface rules and automatic rewriting
does not work as well The rst three examples illustrate some of the diculties
PVS considers restriction pref as a conditional rule which applies only if Ba
reduces to true or false This cannot be expected in general since B depends
on the authentication property being checked The other two lemmas introduce
terms involving rank functions which cannot systematically reduce to true As
a result the chains or reductions required to apply conditional rules often fail
Despite these limitations some form of automation is still possible The
proofs of P  R  RankUserrho have a regular pattern and the same se
quences of proof commands are applied repeatedly For example if P is of the
form reci
j
m  Q then the corresponding PVS proof starts by the following
sequent

 recijm  Q  R  RankUserrho	
The natural rst step is to apply rewrite restriction pref This yields

 IF Rrecijm THEN Stop
ELSE recijm  Q  R ENDIF  RankUserrho	
The obvious case split generates two subgoals The rst one can be solved im
mediately using the rewrite rules for Stop and the second is

 recijm Q  R  RankUserrho
 Rrecijm	
Lemma rank user input can be applied and further propositional simplication
yields
	
 rhom

 Q  R  RankUserrho
 Rrecijm	
At this point the same sequence of proof commands applies if Q is a prex
expression which starts by a reception event More generally successive goals in
such proofs are of the form
			

 P  R  RankUserrho
			
and the syntactic form of P determines a sequence of commands which can be
used systematically
We exploit this regularity by dening specic proof strategies An initialisa
tion strategy installs automatic rules for Stop together with rank user input
and rank user output The other strategies correspond to particular CSP op
erators For example the strategy prefix applies the following command
try rewrite restriction pref
then liftif assert prop
skip	
This performs the four steps of the proof sketched previously The strategy at
tempts to rewrite the current goal with restriction pref If this fails skip
leaves the goal unchanged otherwise an expression of the form IF Ra THEN
Stop ELSE a  P  R ENDIF is introduced Three commands are then ap
plied successively In the second step assert activates automatic rewriting
As a result the rst branch of the conditional is reduced to true and the second
branch is rewritten by one of rank user input or rank user output The eect
of prefix depends on whether a is a transmission or a reception event and is
described in Fig 
Reception Events a  recijm
 m  
  P  R sat RankUserRa 
  a P   R sat RankUser
Transmission Events a  transijm
  m  
Ra    P  R sat RankUserRa 
  a P   R sat RankUser
Fig  Eect of the prefix strategy
With similar strategies for the other CSP primitives the proofs can be con
ducted at a fairly abstract level The details of the PVS mechanics are hidden
		
from the user who simply selects the right strategy When none applies the
remaining sequents do not contain any process expression and correspond to
simple properties of the rank function which have to be proved by other means
The structure of the proofs is for a large part independent of the rank function
under investigation It is easy to experiment with various rank functions and
most of the proofs remain unchanged
 Applications
We have experimented the PVS mechanization on two versions of the Need
ham Schroeder public key protocol 	 All the properties examined in 	 have
been mechanically veried 
 In the sequel we consider the following variant
proposed by Lowe


A B  fN
a
Ag
K
b
B  A  fN
a
N
b
Bg
K
a
A B  fN
b
g
K
b

 Encryption
The rst step in the analysis is to model public key encryption We follow 	
and represent messages by an abstract data type
message DATATYPE WITH SUBTYPES key nonkey
BEGIN
text x text Text  text  nonkey
nonce x nonce Nonce  nonce  nonkey
user x user Identity  user  nonkey
publicx public Identity  public  key
secretx secret Identity  secret  key
conc x conc y conc message  conc  nonkey
code x code key y code message  code  nonkey
END message	
In this data type the subtypes key and nonkey are similar to extra recognisers
The rst ve constructors dene elementary messages of dierent natures and
the last two correspond to concatenation and encryption
Asymmetric cryptosystems satisfy the identity ffmg
K
a
g
K
  
a
 m but the
equivalent PVS assumption
codesecreti codepublici m  m
is not sound it contradicts the data type axioms Instead we use a function
crypto which performs message normalisation We can then dene the message
generation relation  as follows

K
x
and K
 
x
are xs public and private key fmg
K
is m encrypted using K
	
GenSm INDUCTIVE bool 
Sm
OR EXISTS m m GenSm AND GenSm AND mconcm m
OR EXISTS m GenSconcm m OR GenSconcm m
OR EXISTS m k GenSm AND GenSk AND mcryptok m
S m bool  GenSm	
GenS is the set of messages which can be generated from S and is dened
inductively PVS automatically generates two induction axioms for Gen from
which we can show the required monotonicity assumption
gen monotonic COROLLARY
subsetS S AND S  m IMPLIES S  m	
  Users and Verications
The modelling allows several variants of the protocol to be analysed from the
simple case of two participants executing a single run to multiple runs executed
concurrently In a simple example the initiator is described by the process below
userA processevent 
Choice
 i x
 transa i pubi concNa usera 
 reca i puba concNa x useri 
 transa i pubi x  Stopevent	
User A nondeterministically initiates a single run with some user i by sending
the message fN
a
 ag encrypted with K
i
 Then A is ready to receive a message
of the form fN
a
 x ig
K
a
coming from i where x is any nonce A responds to this
message by sending back fxg
K
i

We assume that the responder B behaves as if participating in a run with A
userB processevent 
Choice
 y
 recb a pubb concy usera 
 transb a puba concy Nb userb 
 recb a pubb Nb  Stopevent
and we want to prove that reception of fN
b
g
K
b
by B ensures that B is eec
tively communicating with A More precisely we want to prove that the network
satises T authenticates R where T and R are as follows
T setevent  f e  e  recb a pubb Nb g
R setevent  f e  e  transa b pubb Nb g	
As shown in  this property does not hold for the original NeedhamSchroeder
protocol reception of fN
b
g
K
b
still ensures that A sent the message but to a user
which may be dierent from B The property holds for Lowes variant provided
the ENEMY does not know N
b
or the secret keys of A and B
The rank function we use for the property above is dened in 	 It satises
the essential property below
	
rhopubi m 
IF ia AND EXISTS x mconcx Nb userb THEN 
ELSE rhom ENDIF	
In order to apply the main theorem the most important part of the verication
is to show the four following lemmas
interface userA LEMMA subsetsigmauserA LocalEventsa
interface userB LEMMA subsetsigmauserB LocalEventsb
rank user a LEMMA userA  R  RankUserrho
rank user b LEMMA userB  R  RankUserrho	
The interface constraints are easily checked The proof script for interface userA
is given below
AUTOREWRITE localtransmission localreception
interfaceprefevent interfacestopevent
EXPAND userA
REWRITE interfacechoice	
The rst command installs the automatic rewrite rules presented in Sec 
and the second expands the denition of userA The third step is a manual
application of the interface rule for unbounded choice This triggers automatic
rewriting and the goal is solved at once
The proofs of the rank preservation properties apply the strategies for choice
and prex On the remaining goals we use the predened strategy grind
which expands the denitions of rho and R and applies the decision procedures
This is often enough to solve the goals but sometimes the extensionality axioms
for the message data type are needed see 
 for details For example the proof
script of rank user a is
INITCSP Identity message
EXPAND userA
CHOICE
PREFIX
 DELETE  GRIND

PREFIX
PREFIX
DELETE  
GRIND
CASE xuseryconcconcconc				  b
 APPLY REPEAT APPLYEXTENSIONALITY
 REPLACE  ASSERT	
The proofs of authentication properties we have performed with PVS are all
similar to the previous example The most general situations where concurrent
protocol runs are considered require much more complex rank functions But
even in such cases the PVS proofs are not substantially harder The same proof
strategies are used together with grind and extensionality rules
	
 Discussion and Related Work
This paper shows that PVS can provide ecient support for a nontrivial appli
cation of CSP The usefulness of the mechanisation is clear In our experience
manual verication of the constraints on rank functions simply does not work
PVS has found many errors in our own manual proofs of authentication prop
erties The proofs we performed generalise the results presented in  to more
complex variants of the Needham Schroeder protocol In recent works larger
protocols have been veried 
The basis of our mechanisation is a semantics embedding of CSP and PVS is
adequate for this purpose Camilleri  and Thayer 	 present similar embed
dings in HOL and IMPS Our main contribution compared with these works is
the application to the specic problem of authentication and the development
of PVS theories for this purpose
In the analysis of security protocols tools exist which support various belief
logics  	 Closer to our approach are methods based on modelling protocols
as collections of rules for transforming and reducing messages Tool support in
this area   is mostly based on analysis for reachability of an insecure state
which corresponds to the existence of an attack This usually requires nitary
models and the inability to nd an attack does not in itself guarantee correctness
of the fullscale protocol Our verication approach is then a useful complement
to these state exploration techniques
Paulson 	 investigates the application of IsabelleHOL to proving security
properties of protocols by induction He species protocols in terms of traces
and rules about how traces can be augmented This is clearly very close to the
CSP trace model but gives no control over when rules may apply In contrast
the CSP approach maintains the order of protocol steps and the order in which
proof rules are applied Paulson has some useful results about proof reuse while
at present we know little about the potential reusability of rank functions
In future developments we envisage to increase the level of proof automa
tion Currently we provide specialised proof commands but the user still has to
manually select the right rule This could be automatized the rule to apply can
be determined from the toplevel operator in a CSP process Another extension
would be to allow a more exible modelling of the space of messages The use of
a PVS data type implies that messages constructed in dierent ways are dier
ent Algebraic properties such as the associativity of concatenation or the fact
that publickey and privatekey encryption are inverse of each other cannot be
introduced as equations The approach of 	 remains valid even in the presence
of more complex equational properties This can be implemented with PVS but
requires extra developments such as a quotient construction for data types
Another important avenue to explore will be the extent to which construction
of rank functions can be assisted by the attempt to provide a PVS proof Par
ticular constraints on the rank function arise when instantiating the CSP rules
and could be generated by a blank run of the PVS proof the rank constraints
appear as unresolved leaves in the prooftree Collecting the information may
then help us to identify a suitable rank function
	
In conclusion we have presented a viable mechanical support in PVS for
the verication of security protocols with respect to authentication properties
There is still much to be done to support verication in the presence of algebraic
properties of cryptographic mechanisms to improve automation and to gain
experience by investigating further protocols
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